The Battle for God

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Religion was not the spent force it was thought to be in mid-century. Fundamentalism showed that religion was so vital to people that their political activity would change much of the world community. This would sometimes become so polarized that people could no longer understand each other. In her last chapter Armstrong asks the consequences of this, how should the phenomena of fundamentalism be measured? Has its threat subsided? In Iran, the changes were particularly troubling to many. Revolution was when a populist modern secularism ousted an elitist out-of-touch religion. The reverse wasn't comprehensible. But facts had to be faced. Clearly the majority of Iranians did not hold modernity as good and wanted an Islamic state. However, there was no consensus as to how to do this. Success had come too quickly and unexpectedly. Some wanted return to the 1906 constitution with clerical advise to the government. The madrasahs wanted Khomeini as the clerical ruler. The other ayatollahs were opposed to such a change from tradition. Serious dispute went on for a while. A draft constitution was drafted by Khomeini's followers. Pretty well all the many other factions were against it. But nothing unites people like a common enemy. Although the American and Iranian authorities had behaved carefully and without provocation thus far, Khomeini expected American intervention to protect their interests. Then the exiled Shah was accepted into the USA for cancer treatments and Khomeini demanded his return to Iran for prosecution, and that others that had acted against the Iranian people be gathered up - with Prime Minister Bazargan a principle target of this attack. When Bazargan was in Algiers for a celebration, he was observed shaking hands with President Carter's National Security Advisor. This triggered 3000 students to storm the American Embassy in Tehran taking 90 hostages. By simply waiting a few days Khomeini made everyone realize his power. Bazargan resigned, and Khomeini threw in with the surprised students for the long siege. The international attention added to his authority. After release of woman and blacks, the remaining 52 were held 444 days. Khomeini became acknowledged the leader because of the clear enemy, the great Shaitan, the USA. He said to his new prime minister Bani Sadr: "This action has many benefits. The Americans do not want to see the Islamic Republic taking root. We keep the hostages, finish our internal work, then release them. This has united our people. Our opponents do not dare act against us. We can put the constitution to the people's vote without difficulty, and carry out presidential and parliamentary elections. When we have finished all these jobs, we can let the hostages go." Khomeini felt himself the "leader of the ummah in its struggle against Western imperialism." There were four coup attempts in Iran. And in September 1980 Saddam Hussein invaded Iran with the encouragement of the USA. When the hostages were finally released in January 1981, on President Reagan's inauguration, Iran's international image was very tarnished. The assault against an embassy, and the initial poor treatment of the embassy workers was fails any religious standard, including Islam. This was odd for a group that wanted all law based on the Koran. Religion fails when it becomes a "theology of rage and hatred". It may have been excellent politics, but it was neither religious nor Islamic. But fundamentalism sees itself as "fighting for survival in a hostile world. This affects and sometimes distorts vision. Khomeini ... suffered from the paranoid fantasies that afflict so many fundamentalists." By '83 clerics became the larger part of the Iranian Majlis. Opposition was not permitted. The new regime had become as autocratic as the old one. But there was a theology for this. The people could themselves achieve perfection. "Democracy of opinion" was not needed. They would follow the example of the leader whose mystical journey had given him the "perfect faith". This was not dictatorship, but a reclaiming of society for God. Only by "unity of expression" could Muslims withstand the secular west. People who opposed the new regime were denounced. People who were irreligious were judged worthy of death. This seemed medieval to western observers, but the people had largely not been included in modern Iran and they loved Khomeini. The rights of the individual were not part of their experience nor expectation. "They still spoke and thought in a religious, premodern way that many Westerners could no longer comprehend." Fundamentalists of other persuasions also tended to dogmatic conformity, an insistence that only their own version of faith was authentic. But for the present "unity of expression" was consolidating the new Iran. An important part of this change was the return of spirituality to Iranian society. Premodern society had a balance of logos and mythos. Modern society too often focused only on logos - and in the separation of religion and politics. In the new Iran the lines between these was often blurred. The severe economic difficulty of war and isolation from the west made it difficult for Khomeini to assist the poor. Politics was a hard affair. Unemployment was 30%. But the charitable nature of Islam helped address many of these issues, like interest free loans (the Koran forbids usury). The Foundation for the Downtrodden was formed to address the needs of the poor youth of Iran through many projects and involved millions of people. Of course Khomeini was aware of the tension between religion and politics - he had spent his entire life in that place. Where the west had discovered that participatory democracy best fit industrial society, Iran was finding its own equilibrium. Khomeini's ideas were being translated from theory to practice. Such an example was land reform. It was important to distribute land to the poor. But the religious establishment had much of the land. The Shariah was not amenable to this change. The various groups within the structures of the new Velayat-e Faqih had different perspectives on this issue. Deadlock ensued first from the different political agendas. When Khomeini tried to convince the Guardians with spiritual arguments that they should look beyond their self interest in the interest of the country, that also was unsuccessful - persons who become political tend to be rather much self-interested. The Speaker of the Majlis, Rafsangani urged Khomeini to use his supreme power to accomplish the land reform by fiat.but Khomeini refused, realizing that if he intervened, he diminished the authority of the institutions newly formed to govern the country. He next tried to shame the ulema by pointing to the example of the child martyrs. These children were from the slums of Iran that crowded the mosques and in the limited choices and opportunities open to them and the incitement of war and revolution asked to be sent to the front in the war with Iraq. From the foundation for the Downtrodden, tens of thousands of youth stepped forward, after the government passed a law permitting enlistment of youth as young as 12 years old. These wards of the state, were promised a place in paradise should they die. And die they did. They cleared mine fields, carried out suicide-bomber attacks, and ran in front of regular troops. The selfless example of these kids inspired Khomeini. They epitomized for him the best of Islam. Unlike their elders they had transcended self interest. "Martyrdom had become a crucial part of Iran's revolt against the rational pragmatism of the West and essential to the Greater Jihad for the nation's soul. But despite Khomeini's insistence that martyrdom was not "nothingness", there was nihilism in this shocking dispatch of thousands of children to an early, violent death. It contravened fundamental human values, crucial to religious and secularists alike, about the sacred inviobility of life and our instinctive urge to protect our children at the cost of our own lives, if necessary. This cult of the child-martyr was another fatal distortion of faith, to which fundamentalists in all three monotheistic traditions are prone. It sprang, perhaps, from the terror that comes from battling against powerful enemies who seek our destruction. But it also shows how perilous it can be to translate a mystical, mythical imperative into a pragmatic, military or political policy. ...Again what works well in the spiritual domain can become destructive and even immoral if interpreted literally and practically in the mundane world." Another serious dispute was the development of modern labor law. The Shariah after all was a pre-industrial code of law. The ulema resisted radical change to bring this law into accord with the present requirements of society. Khomeini made what was in effect a declaration of independence and declared that the state must have a monopoly in certain practical matters. A rather timid president Khameini thought this meant the Supreme Faqih could "interpret" the law, but Khomeini corrected him and declared that the government was not merely to interpret law, but was the very vehicle of law - a crucial part of what God intended. In 1988 he said, "The government is empowered to unilaterally revoke any lawful agreement ... if the agreement contravenes the interests of Islam and the country. It can prevent any matter, whether religious or secular, if it is against the interests of Islam." This was a full circle break with the Shii tradition where religion gave meaning to politics but was separate from it. Now a religious led government was to be free to pursue both the interest of the people and the good of Islam. In his last years, Khomeini was not claiming this authority to the the office of Supreme Faqih, but rather to the Majlis. This was surprising to all, especially to his supporters, but a creative understanding of the matter. Rafsanjani saw in this a better "democracy" than that in the West, because it was rooted in God. What God had revealed to the prophet and in the Koran was not a closed matter. Government was the means of extending what was the new and present need of law. In the election that followed a more progressive constituency was put in place - where only a quarter of them had traditional madrassah education. In this more pragmatic climate, Khomeini insisted on leadership of reconstruction projects by qualified experts and specialists. The constitution was again addressed and a new committee struck to consider changes. It is illustrative of the complexity of this to observe that this difficult evolution took place at the same time that Khomeini issue the fatwah against Salman Rushdie for his "blasphemous" novel The Satanic Verses - "to put to death Salman Rushdie and his publishers, wherever they are found." We did not notice in the West, that the following month 44 of 45 nations at the Islamic Conference condemned that fatwah as un-Islamic. That it could not apply to non-Muslim countries. That there had been no trial. It was another distortion of Islam. To the West it was an act of war. Again two sides had irreconcilable perspectives and neither could understand the other's views. Khomeini died shortly after in June 1989. Iran did not fall apart after his death, but actually continued on its own path to a secular style of government. The new constitution made changes that allowed more qualified persons to stand for the various political offices. Khameini replaced Khomeini as Faqih and Rafsanjani the President. The reforms that had not been possible earlier and resulted in stalemate were finally passed. BBC has just posted a marvelous series of articles on this Iranian system of government and its intricate set of checks and balances. Check it out. "The people of Iran are less hostile to modern values than before, because they are able to approach them in an Islamic milieu." Abdolkarim Sorush is such an example. He is a theologian educated in the West. He does not accept accept the Western secular ethos that has no place for religion. He neither accepts religious rule - "the cause of religion is too great to be entrusted to the clergy"-."nothing unreasonable can be God's will". He is regarded as an advocate of human rights and a liberal secularist in Iran. As a popular and powerful figure he thus moderates much extreme opinion. For more on Sorush check out the article, For an Open Interpretation of the Koran , in the German Islamic WebZine, http://quantara.de "Soroush argues that because human cognition is changeable, so too is humankind's cognition of its religion because cognition in any era generally depends on the prevailing state of science in that era. This is why faith is continually being elucidated in new ways. These new interpretations are adapted to suit the conditions in which the interpreting person lives. Soroush is trying to justify a political system that is both Islamic and democratic. His starting point is the approximate nature of cognition. Humankind cannot really ever know what God expects of it. It will never find out what God's law really is or what purpose it serves. God's intentions are unfathomable." In '97 Seyyed Khatami got a landslide election to the presidency and dissociated his government from the Rushdie fatwah, and Khameini concurred. There is no retreat from Islam. Iran is on a modern path in a Shii package. Armstrong observes, "It could be that if a radical religious movement is allowed its head, works through its aggressions and resentment, it can learn to interact creatively with other traditions, eschew the violence of the more recent past, and make peace with former foes. Religion becomes most violent when suppressed." In Egypt in 1981, Anwar Sadat was assassinated by Khaled Islambuili. Westerners were shocked and surprised. He was a moderate Muslim they could understand. But the Egyptian people did not weep for Sadat. He had been regarded as a "Tartar" (a person who was Muslim only in name). Sadat tried to avoid the troubles of Iran. In '78 he had enacted the "Law of Shame. Any deviation in thought, word, or deed from the established order was to be punished with loss of civil rights and confiscation of passports and property." Egypt was becoming more suppressive. Shortly before he died, he imprisoned 1536 of his adversaries from all levels in society. After the assassination, a paper circulated amongst these rebels called "The Neglected Duty", written by Abd al-Salam Faraj, the spiritual guide of Islambuili's Jihad organization. This revealed the thinking of Sadat's opposition. They felt an urgent need to create an Islamic state because they understood it to be God's impatient injunction as revealed in the Koran. The time for peaceful method was over, only a holy war, Jihad would do. Jihad was the "neglected duty" of the title. The sword was the only way to establish a just society. "Verses of the sword" in the Koran are often quoted by those who espouse violence. Similarly, the Koran advocates the death of Muslim apostates. Although Sadat was a self-proclaimed honest Muslim publicly practicing the "five pillars of Islam", his enemies reasoned that since he did not practice Shariah law, but law of his own invention, he was not a true Muslim and deserved death. Infidels had taken over Egypt. In other words, the political talk of Sadat's enemies was entirely in the context of theological debate with reference to the Koran and the Hadith as to the course of right action. They felt that if they could but establish a true Islamic state, God would intervene on their behalf to satisfy their other goals (like the return of Jerusalem). They could quite entirely rely on miraculous intervention. The rule of the infidel would fall and the world would become Muslim. Like other fundamentalists, Faraj was a literalist, believing words of scripture could be, should be taken directly into life. But God did not intervene. Hosni Mubarak replaced Sadat and things went on as usual. Mubarak did immediately release Sadat's recent roundup from prison. He continued to control Muslim dissidence, but did allow more. He permitted the Muslim Brotherhood for example to participate in elections, even while still "illegal". Since the time of Nasser, Egypt is becoming a very religious country. The people are more disciplined in their religious practice. It is still difficult to transition from the country to the city and to learn the skills of modern industrial society. There is a return to segregation of men and women, of traditional dress, and prayer is a normal part of daily life again. The religion of the mainstream is a moderate form of fundamentalism. There is cooperation with the Egyptian Coptic Church who compose 10% of the population. They do not want to return to the past, but want the future to be Muslim. Liberty and Democracy grow slowly under Mubarak. There is a constant low level war between the "two nations" of Egypt, and occasionally attacks against foreigners. Human rights groups claimed 20,000 suspected guerrillas were being detained without trial in Egyptian prisons. In November of '97, 62 tourists were massacred at Luxor by Jamaat al-Islamiyyah. "Desperation and helplessness have continued to inspire a minority of Sunni Muslims in Egypt to turn Islam into an ideology that, in its justification of murder, is a total distortion of religion." At this very time (Nov 2005) an election is occurring in Egypt (a process of stages that take months) and the Muslim Brotherhood are increasing their share of the vote to about 30%. They run as independents but speak as Brothers. Since Banna's time, the Brotherhood has committed itself to charitable works in all of Egypt, and this reflects in their popularity. Check out on BBC the Guide to the Egyptian Election and other links on the Brotherhood on the BFG Internet Study Links page. Israel also was becoming a more religious country. Increasingly the Hasidim became involved in politics. The trial of Adolf Eichmann in '61 had reminded everyone again of the Holocaust, and increased the sense of the religious that secularism was a great evil. But if one must fight to survive, one must become political. And if one must become political, one must be accommodating. The Likud gained power in '77 and Agudat became a member of the coalition government. This caused some of the religious in-fighting to be reflected in the Knesset. Rabbi Eliezer Schach, leader of the Lithuanian Jews in Israel worried about the influence of the Sephardic Jews who were increasingly influenced by Agudat Israel, and so founded a Sephardic party, Shas Torah Guardians. The Sephardics had not experienced the ghetto and took to politics with gusto. Or again, the Seventh Rebbe ordered his followers to vote in '88 for the Agudat to the end of making the government make a restrictive definition as to who was a Jew. This of course would have alienated many Jews around the world, especially in America, and so was an impossible thing politically for the state to do. These disputes caused new religious political parties and to everyone's surprise, they gained 18 seats in the '88 elections and held the balance of power between Labor and Likud. People who did not believe in Israel, or politics, had in effect stolen into the camp of the enemy. When in '90 that balance came down to a Rabbi speaking to 10000 of the ultra-orthodox to advise their vote in the upcoming election, the whole nation listened. When the Rabbi spoke not at all of any of the political concerns that concerned the nation, in a mixture of language they were unfamiliar with, they were confused. His speech was to the Haridim alone, and was a religious speech about the war they were fighting for the master of the universe. Labourites were amazed to hear themselves both described as anti-Jewish and unholy. But the religious Zionists and Gush were also ready for a stand. And the Kookists felt betrayed by Likud by making peace with the Arabs. If that was not enough, the Arabs had started their civil disobedience known as in '87. Settlers that at the start had declared their desire to help the Palestinian and break down walls of hatred, were now becoming extremely provocative, even vigilantes. These behaviors were a distortion of the Jewish faith that insisted on justice and loving kindness to the stranger in their midst. "Rabbi Hillel an older contemporary of Jesus, had summed up the teachings of Judaism in the Golden Rule: "Do not do unto others as you would not have done unto you." With fundamentalist selectivity, however, Kookists concentrated only on the more aggressive biblical passages, in which God commanded the Israelites to drive out the indigenous people of the Promised Land, to make no treaty with them, to destroy their sacred symbols, and even to exterminate them. They interpreted the belief that the Jews were God's chosen people to mean that they were not bound by the laws obligatory for other nations, but were unique, holy, and set apart." Many Kookist believed the Arab could stay only as a "resident alien". Others didn't want outsiders at all, and wished to deport the Arabs. In '80, a Rabbi Israel Hess published an article entitled "Genocide: A Commandment of the Torah" at Bar-Ilan University. Hatred, murder and terror exchanged between both sides. An underground movement was found and stopped that plotted to blow up the Muslim Dome of the Rock. Traditionally Jews felt the Messiah would rebuild the temple, and lived at peace in Jerusalem with the Arabs. The Arabs in turn granted them special access to the Western Wall (the last relic of Herod's temple). Suleiman the Magnificent built a shrine there for the Jews. But that ancient harmony disappeared with the violent history since the 1920's. When the Six-Day War gave Israel control of Jerusalem, access again to this wall was a profoundly spiritual experience for many. Jewish fundamentalists with their literalism, and inflexibility, felt that their intervention was necessary before God would intercede in history and Messiah would return. If in fact, the Dome of the Rock Mosque had been blown up, the entire Muslim world would have declared war on Israel. It could well spark World War III. But these people didn't care about such a political measure, for they were God's true servants. "This was kabbalistic thinking gone mad. It is a terrifying example of the fundamentalist tendency to use mythology as a blueprint for action." Twenty eight precision bombs had been made. A plan perfected. They were ready, and all that remained when discovered was the sanction of a rabbi. Rabbi Meir Kahane, was such a man. His fundamentalism was archetypal and so reductionist that it was a caricature of Judaism: to do what "God wants". And what God wants is Israel to be Jewish, not Arab. It was a dark vision of destruction and death. The state of Israel was not a blessing for Jews, but God's revenge on the gentiles. Palestinians had not shared the religious revival in the Muslim world after '67, for they had experienced the inside of defeat in that war. Yasir Arafat reorganized the PLO into a guerrilla movement with political aims - a decidedly secular decision. A second movement was Mujamah. It formed in '71 by Sheikh Aimed Yasin, who based Mujamah on the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and established a charitable empire in the Gaza Strip. Like Banna, Yasin was a reformer wanting to bring modern benefits to his people in Islamic terms. A third Palestinian movement was Islamic Jihad. They applied the ideology of Sayyid Qutb and saw themselves as fighting a religious battle "against the forces of arrogance - against the colonial enemy all over the world". But it was the insistent pressure of intifadah that made the difference. Intifadah showed the will of the Palestinian, showed to the world by constant media attention, the conditions of Palestinian living, and challenge the Israeli government. Intifadah was primarily secular. As in Egypt where a militant faction came from the Brotherhood, so here, a militant faction came from Mujamah, called HAMAS. (Haqamat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah - Islamic Resistance Movement). HAMAS fought Israel because they were enemy #1 and the PLO because they were not Islamic. The believed themselves to be fighting against Israel's plan to destroy Islam, and so fighting in self-defense. As ever, violence and oppression breeds more violence. The Oslo Accords of '93 required Arafat to control the Palestinian terrorists, but of course he couldn't, because he also was their enemy. The Accords also incensed the Jewish fundamentalists, for the government was giving away sacred land. Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated by a theology student convinced of Rabin's apostasy. Like the murder of Sadat, Rabin's murder showed this inner war between the societies of the Middle East between the religious and the secular. For fundamentalists and secularists of whatever faith are at war because they have "entirely different conceptions of the sacred," Amos Oz, an Israeli novelist observed. The secularists were just as angry about their own high values being threatened as were the religious about theirs. Oz saw the gush as threatening "to bring down upon us a savage and insane bloodlust.". "For secularists and liberals - be they Jewish, Christian, or Muslim - such Enlightenment values as the autonomy of the individual and intellectual liberty, are inviolable and holy. They cannot compromise or make concessions on such issues. These principles are so central to the liberal or secular identity that if they are threatened, people feel that their very existence is in jeopardy. Just as fundamentalists fear annihilation at the hands of the secularist, a liberal like ... Each, the religious and the secularist, gazes at the other with horror. Neither can see the other clearly. Both recall the excesses, cruelties, and intolerance of the "other side" and, wounded to the core, they cannot make peace." Although the fundamentalists in the United States were law abiding, there was still polarization and hostility. Two equal antagonistic camps divide the nation. In '84 the Gallop people found 43% called themselves liberals and 41% conservatives. Other polls identified 9% as fundamentalist, though the tenets of Protestant fundamentalism were broadly held: 44 % that salvation was only through Christ, 30% were "born again", 28% believed in biblical literalism, 27% denied the Bible could have historical or scientific error. In '87 there were a series of scandals in televangelism, having to do with money, sex and gross triviality. Armstrong observes that when one turns the mythos into logos, the experience of the intuitive and mystical disconnects from religion somewhat, and leaves a great hunger unaddressed. The American response is the Revival, and it can lead to anarchy and neurosis. It is not unexpected then that trouble took the form it did. Vast sums of money, and the nature of mass media distance the stars from reality. This was particularly evident in the PTL (Praise the Lord) organization of Jim and Tammy Faye Bakker. Their life style had grown to an extravagance unusual even in America. Their Disney style Christian Theme Park filled in the missing elements of an austere Protestantism with pageantry, spectacle and forbidden play. God's love had been turned into God's infinite forgiveness. Rationality had run its course and the antinomian rebellion we have observed before occurred here. It became "Anything Goes." The way to God's forgiveness had necessarily to pass first through acts of sin and shame. Both Bakker's went off the rails in this fashion. Of course these things were distortions of Christianity. We have observed the pattern in the other religions as well. Jerry Falwell was called to rescue the network. Jimmy Swaggart had first brought attention to PTL. Falwell turned on him. Turned out Swaggart had engaged in the same sort of scandalous behavior. Bakker turned on Falwell who was trying to rescue PTL. Falwell then accused Bakker of homosexuality. Tammy Faye tried to bribe herself a huge severance. At the end, Jim Bakker was in jail, Swaggart lost his empire, Falwell resigned the Moral Majority. Televangelism was greatly reduced. Swaggart was Pentecostal. Pentecostals had earlier been the opposite of fundamentalism. They were socially inclusive, not exclusive. Their compassion broke down racial and class barriers. They honored the mysterious, the magical, the emotional, the spiritual. But Swaggart for all his success (he was the most successful of the televangelists reaching "half the homes on the planet"), preached none of these things. His message was one of hatred and condemnation. He specialized in identifying the foe, and vociferously denouncing them. By getting on the band-wagon of the Moral Majority he was able to have more targets for his attacks. His skills as an orator however were able to have entire stadiums of people experience religious ecstasy. In premodern times, such religious ecstasy was to be carefully controlled. Mysticism was a high discipline. The power of the divine was so great that much preparation and training was required, often half a life time was the price paid for admission to the secrets of the spiritual domain. But with modernity focusing only on the rational, most of this mystical lore had been lost. It was certainly not familiar to those who newly discovered the power of spirituality, and there was no tradition apparent in which to apprentice to its mastery. And people longed for such spiritual experience. The Christian right seemed to have fizzled out, but this was not so. In '87 a new extreme phase began with attacks on abortion clinics. Randall Terry led services and carried out civil disobedience to stop babies "being murdered". Of course this new campaign was not merely about abortion, as earlier, Scopes had not been only about evolution. The religious were fighting the evils of secularism. There militant language grouped together with "child killing", child pornography, euthanasia, and infanticide. It was American civilization they were fighting for. The Reconstruction movement founded by Gary North and Rousas John Rushdoony has "abandoned the old premillenial pessimism". Their view of things is focussed on the sovereignty of God (not unlike the Muslim fundamentalists). A Christian civilization will defeat Satan soon and usher in the New Millenium. Their key concept is "Dominion", from the creation story in Genesis where God gave dominion over the world to Adam. Their task as they see it is to establish Christian rule before the return of Jesus. They must train for the day God takes away the power of the secular humanists and liberals. Democracy will not be needed in that day, for church and state will no longer be separate. The bible will be put back in charge. Slavery will return. Birth control will cease. Adulterers, homosexuals, blasphemers, astrologers and witches will be killed. Persistently disobedient children will be stoned. God is not on the side of the poor. Socialism is wrong. Capitalism is correct. Welfare is wrong - it encourages sluggards and subsidizes evil. Foreign aid is wrong. Armstrong points out that this extreme totalitarian vision is antithetical to America, and only a remote possibility. However, she also notes that Christianity as we generally know it today is far removed from the practice of Jesus and his first followers. That religion of justice and compassion is sometimes hard to see in the church today. So don't rule out new political religious combinations in the future, no matter how improbable they might seem. Pat Robertson may be a transitional figure in this. A Baptist with Pentecostal leanings, he has a significant influence through his 700 Club TV show and his college. The college is renamed "Regency" - which refers to custodial interim governance, clearly a reference to Dominionism. Fundamentalism is not going to disappear. Religion shapes opposition to government. '93 saw the FBI assault on David Koresh's Branch Davidian group in Texas, and revealed the ignorance of the authorities of the goals of the sect, and a gross inability to control such confrontations. There are groups well beyond those we have studied, as extreme as human beings are capable of. Armstrong closes with a brief description of one - the fascist Christian Identity group. Religion did not disappear with the advent of secular modernism. Rather it has found new forms within society and made a fresh response. If we are to change confrontation to dialogue we must find new ways of speak. "Fundamentalism is now part of the modern world. It represents a widespread disappointment, alienation, anxiety, and rage that no government can safely ignore. So far, efforts to deal with fundamentalism have not been very successful; what lessons can we learn from the past that will help us to deal more creatively in the future with the fears that fundamentalism enshrines?"

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